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Beaudry and Lucke (BL) address one of the classic macroeconomic questions, one
that the NBER Macro Annual often returns to: What shocks drive the business cy-
cle? Their focus is on the role of technology shocks: neutral shocks which a®ect the
production of all goods symmetrically, investment-speci¯c shocks which a®ect invest-
ment production only, and news shocks which re°ect information about future neutral
or investment-speci¯c technological change. BL conclude that news shocks are the
primary mover of the business cycle and that the other technology shocks are essen-
tially irrelevant. This comment explains why the ¯ndings underlying this conclusion
are misleading. Once one acknowledges the limitations of BL's empirical strategy and
introduce a structural framework to address these limitations, the primacy of news
shocks disappears. Contrary to BL's assertions, the data do not point de¯nitively to
one kind of technology shock. A balanced view of the data suggests a role for both
investment and news shocks. One BL ¯nding appears to be robust: neutral shocks
are not important for the business cycle.
The modern business cycle research program at its outset focused on neutral tech-
nology shocks in addition to traditional \demand" shocks such as ¯scal and monetary
shocks. The real business cycle (RBC) model implies a dominant role for neutral
technology shocks. But VAR analysis suggests neutral shocks are not nearly as dom-
inant, especially when nominal variables are included in the analysis.1 Gal¶ ³ (1999)
and Francis and Ramey (2005) argue that estimated declines in hours after an iden-
ti¯ed positive neutral technology shock are incompatible with these shocks playing
an important role in the business cycle. Without other kinds of technology shocks
it would seem the business cycle cannot not be driven by technology shocks. But,
there are other possibilities for technological sources of °uctuations. Two such shocks,
which until recently were not given much attention, are news about future changes
to technology and shocks to investment-speci¯c technology.
Beaudry and Portier (2007) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) demonstrate how
information about future changes in technology can drive business-cycle-like dynamics
1Much of the RBC literature has focused on transitory technology shocks while the VAR literature
emphasizes permanent shocks. Still, early RBC models with permanent technology shocks also show
these shocks accounting for a sign¯cicant fraction of the business cycle. See for example Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992).
2in a DSGE framework. This shock passed its ¯rst VAR test in Beaudry and Portier
(2006). They identify news shocks with innovations to stock prices that have no
contemporaneous e®ect on TFP and a positive long run e®ect on TFP and ¯nd these
shocks to explain a lot of the business cycle variation in consumption.
Shocks to investment-speci¯c technical change have been studied for some time
in the DSGE business cycle literature, starting with Greenwood et al. (1988) and
later Greenwood et al. (2000) and Christiano and Fisher (2003). This work points
toward a possible role for such shocks. The shock passed its ¯rst VAR test in Fisher
(2006). That paper shows that by measuring shocks to this technology as the sole
source of permanent shocks to the relative price of investment goods, investment-
speci¯c technology shocks explain a signi¯cant fraction of the business cycle variation
in output and hours.
Fisher (2006) does not consider news shocks and Beaudry and Portier (2006) do
not consider investment-speci¯c shocks. So it is natural to ask what happens when
you consider both at the same time. This is what BL do. They specify a vector
error correction model (VECM) in total factor productivity (TFP), the real price of
investment, the per capita real value of the stock market, per capita hours, and a
short term interest rate. Popular tests for the number of common trends lead them
to focus on speci¯cations with three common trends. To identify shocks to neutral
technology, investment technology, technology news, preference and monetary policy
they propose two alternative identi¯cation schemes. With three common trends,
both schemes imply news shocks are the dominant source of business cycle variation
in hours and neither neutral nor investment-speci¯c shocks are very important. The
demand shocks also play a limited role.
The remainder of this comment discusses BLs ¯ndings and points out why they are
misleading. The next section describes a simple model to organize thinking about the
empirical problem posed in BL. This reveals some drawbacks of their identi¯cation
assumptions, but does not uncover any serious °aws. The third section discusses
the central role of BL's assertion that there are three common trends in the data.
It reveals that BL essentially provide no support for this assertion and that their
¯ndings are extremely sensitive to the number of common trends assumed to be in
the data. Section four describes and implements an alternative to BLs empirical
3strategy which uses the structural model's implication that there is a single common
trend. This analysis con¯rms that the role ascribed to news shocks by BL is vastly
overstated and that investment shocks are far more important than they suggest. The
penultimate section brie°y discusses a key problem any researcher faces when trying
to identify neutral, investment and news shocks. The ¯nal section brie°y discusses
directions for future research on the sources of the business cycle.2
2 Implications of a Structural Model
It is helpful to introduce a simple model to shed light on BL's analysis. This section
describes a simple stochastic growth model which could be at the heart of any modern
DSGE model. For simplicity, it abstracts from nominal rigidities and emphasizes
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Here Ct;Ht;It;Kt;At and Vt are consumption, hours, investment, capital, neutral
technology and investment-speci¯c technology. The function s(¢) is a standard ad-
justment cost function. The i.i.d. shocks driving this model are neutral technology
2This comment does not address the potential for weak instruments to make it impossible to
disentangle the role of technology shocks with reduced form models. See Watson (2006) for an
insightful discussion on this topic.
4shocks, ´t, investment speci¯c technology shocks, !t, a shock to the e±ciency of the
installation technology, "t; and news about future levels of the neutral, investment
and installation technologyis, »i
t¡i;³i
t¡i and 'i
t¡i. This model has two stochastic trends
arising from growth in the neutral and investment-speci¯c technology, gA and gV:
The neutral and investment shocks are familiar. The news shocks are less familiar
and so they require some discussion. The news shocks are interpreted as signals about
future levels of technology. These signals may occur one to eight quarters before the
level of technology is realized. A signal may be o®set by the current draw of the
innovation so that signals may be incorrect. Notice also that \news" in this model is
in fact 24 shocks, re°ecting signals of three kinds of technology in future over di®erent
horizons. So, any empirical procedure that seeks to extract one news shock, such as
BL's, is necessarily going to be picking up the e®ects of many di®erent shocks that
each have di®erent dynamic e®ects. We should therefore be very careful interpreting
impulse response functions from such a procedure, but the variance decomposition
probably still has meaning.
The installation shock is even less familiar. Recently it has been studied by
Christiano et al. (2008) and Justiniano et al. (2009). It is argued below that by
not taking into account this shock, BL's and similar identi¯cation procedures may
actually be picking up the e®ects of this shock, or something like it. However, most
of this comment proceeds as if this shock is turned o®.
Another unusual feature of this model is the CES aggregator for consumption
and investment goods, G(¢). The CES formulation is the easiest way to introduce an
endogenous relative price of investment goods into a model. This does not appear in
the modern DSGE literature, but it is useful for thinking about identifying investment
shocks using the relative price of investment goods.



















PIt is the price of investment goods in consumption units, and GCt is the derivative
of G with respect to Ct. The expression for the investment price reveals the obvious
5point that if there is any curvature in the transformation frontier then the investment
price does not identify the investment speci¯c shock. Any shock which changes the
ratio of consumption to investment changes the investment price as well. This holds
in much more general settings. For example, Basu et al. (2009) show in an economy
with multiple intermediate and ¯nal goods that the real investment price confounds
technology and variation in the use of intermediate inputs and factors of production.3
This point is important for BL. Essentially, it invalidates the ¯rst of their two
identi¯cations schemes, ID1. The ID1 scheme, the one based exclusively on short
run restrictions, includes the assumption that news and non-technology shocks do
not e®ect the relative price. In light of the relative price expression this assumption
is clearly not plausible. These shocks change the consumption:investment ratio and
hence the relative price.
BLs second identi¯cation scheme, ID2, combines short run and long run restric-
tions. The short run restrictions are that only innovations to TFP can a®ect TFP
contemporaneously and that the monetary policy shock does not a®ect hours con-
temporaneously. Here there is no restriction on what shocks may a®ect the relative
price of investment contemporaneously. The long run restrictions are that only neu-
tral and news shocks a®ect TFP in the long run and that neutral, investment-speci¯c
and news shocks are the only shocks which a®ect investment-speci¯c technology in
the long run. These assumptions are su±cient to just-identify ¯ve shocks to neutral
technology, investment technology, technology news, preferences and monetary policy.
The only problem with the long run restrictions in ID2 is that they allow the
neutral shock to have a long run impact on the investment-speci¯c technology. This
is not true in the model written above. BL consider the over-identifying restriction
that the neutral shock has no long run e®ect on the investment-speci¯c technology
and report that it does not e®ect their ¯ndings. It is unclear how robust this ¯nding
is to the number of common trends assumed.
ID2's short run restrictions on TFP are more problematic. Typical measures of
TFP are well-known to be plagued by di±culties in measuring the factor inputs. Since
3Greenwood et al. (1997) argue that one can identify the neutral technology, At; with a Solow
residual computed using output measured in consumption units. The resource constraint written
with the investment price shows that this approach is valid only if the transformation frontier is
linear, that is GCt = 1.
6these variables are likely to be in°uenced contemporaneously by the other shocks, the
short run restrictions on TFP are implausible unless the endogenous variation in
TFP can be purged. One could go some way toward this by exploiting quarterly
versions of the \cleansed" TFP measure developed by Basu et al. (2006), but BL do
not. Even so, the cleansing done by Basu et al. (2006) is at the annual frequency
and interpolation is used to compile a quarterly series. Therefore this alternative
measure is likely subject to endogeneity problems as well. Still, it is preferable to the
rudimentary TFP measure used by BL.
A second concern about the short-run restrictions on TFP derives from consider-
ation of a multi-sector growth model. An implication of results in Basu et al. (2006)
and Basu et al. (2009) is that aggregate TFP is a weighted average of sectoral TFP.
As an example, consider the simple two-sector growth model with investment good
and consumption good sectors where production functions in each sector are subject
to correlated TFP shocks. In this model measured aggregate TFP is an expenditure
share weighted average of consumption and investment sector TFP. The relative price
of investment is a function of both TFPs as well as factor input usage in the di®erent
sectors. As long as consumption and investment shocks are not perfectly correlated,
then shocks to either sector's TFP will in°uence both aggregate TFP and the relative
price of investment. Consequently, the short run restriction that the relative price
does not e®ect aggregate TFP is invalid in this model. Note however, it is valid in the
model written above. In this model conventional measures of TFP correctly identify
the neutral technology, up to endogenous variation in factor inputs.
While the preceding certainly raises doubts about the paper's ¯ndings, some may
view them as quibbles. And there are many things to like about the identi¯cation
strategy ID2. It is simple and, setting aside the caveats just mentioned, intuitively
appealing. Therefore, for the remainder of this comment I consider the implications
of adopting ID2.
3 Common Trends in the Data
A central element of BL is its approach to co-integrating relationships, that is common
trends. Unfortunately BL provide no guidance whatsoever on the sort of relationships
7we should expect to see in the data. Essentially BL attempt to \let the data speak"
alone on this issue. In the context of co-integration, this is an empirical strategy
fraught with peril. This section explains why this is so and shows how sensitive BL's
results are to the assumed number of common trends.
Recall that the baseline empirical model is a VECM in ¯ve variables: logs of TFP,
the relative price of investment, the per capita real value of the stock market, per
capita hours and a short term interest rate. To implement the VECM BL need to
settle on lag lengths and the number of co-integrating relationships. BL follow a
robust strategy for choosing lag length by allowing enough lags to remove any serial
correlation from the residuals. They work with ¯ve lags. For the co-integrating
relationships, they rely on a much less robust approach due to Johanssen. This leads
them to focus on three common trends.
One advantage the authors attribute to the VECM framework is that it allows
them to bypass issues regarding the stationarity of hours. In particular, while their
VECM requires that hours are included in ¯rst di®erences, in principle one of the
co-integrating vectors could put weight only on hours so that the model is equivalent
to one where hours are stationary in levels. In practise, while the hours variable
is stationary, the estimated error correction terms all put weight on every variable
in the system. So it unclear whether the stated advantage has any practical value.
However, even if it does, by including hours and a short term interest rate in the
VECM another problem crops up.
In the baseline case, the Johanssen procedure for determining the number of com-
mon trends involves sequentially testing the hypotheses of no more than zero, one,
two or three co-integrating vectors. The ¯rst time the test is not rejected determines
the number of co-integrating vectors. BL ¯nd that no more than zero, one and two
co-integrating vectors are rejected at the 5% level, but that the hypothesis of no more
than three is not rejected. This is their justi¯cation for focusing on three common
trends. Note that, while two stochastic trends and ¯ve integrated variables are con-
sistent with three common trends, this scenario is also consistent with one or two
common trends as well.
The problem with this empirical strategy was documented by Elliott (1998) in a
famous Econometrica article. He studied the performance of popular tests for the
8order of co-integration when there are variables in the system that are incorrectly
assumed to have an exact unit root. He found that even very small departures from
a unit root lead to a severe breakdown in the size properties of the tests. Recall that
\size" relates to the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis. Elliott
(1998) ¯nds that the size of Johanssen tests could approach unity, that is there is
close to a one hundred percent chance of incorrectly rejecting the null, for even small
deviations from a unit root.
Should BL be worried about this? De¯nitely. The variables per capita hours and
short term interest rates are notorious for their unit root like behavior even though
the series themselves are stationary. BL even go out of their way to point out that
their per capita hours series is stationary. While working in ¯rst di®erences may be
justi¯ed in some situations, for instance forecasting, it is clearly a drawback when
testing for the number of common trends.
Given the lack of information conveyed by the statistical tests, BL should assess
the robustness of their ¯ndings to the assumption of three common trends. Since
they focus on three common trends, they should present a compelling argument for
why this is a plausible way to view the data. They do neither of these things. Instead
BL dismiss less than three common trends by appealing to the permanent response
of hours to their identi¯ed monetary policy shock.
This a spurious argument. Only if one is interested in identifying monetary shocks
does the permanent response of hours to an identi¯ed monetary shock matter. One
can still address questions about the role of technology shocks in the business cycle
without having to label other shocks in the system. This is because the identi¯cation
assumptions for technology are not invalidated by the existence of some linear com-
bination of underlying structural shocks which have a permanent impact on hours.
This is all their ¯nding about hours is indicating. So, BL do not provide a valid
rationale for focusing on three common trends.
As it turns out the results are very sensitive to how many common trends are
assumed to be in the data. To make this point, consider a version of BL's baseline
system with slightly di®erent choices for how the variables are measured. TFP is the
one developed by Basu et al. (2006). This measure of TFP is preferred to the one
used by BL since the underlying capital and labor service series are more carefully
9constructed and the treatment of endogeneity is more sophisticated.4 The invest-
ment price is the NIPA nonresidential ¯xed investment de°ator divided by the chain
weighted de°ator for consumption of non-durables and services. Using the quality
adjusted measures described by BL does not change the results substantively. The
stock variable is measured with the per capita S&P 500 de°ated in the same was as
the investment price. Both of these measures depart from the variables used by BL.
BL use the overall consumption de°ator for their baseline measures of these variables.
The nondurables and services de°ator is preferred because it is the measure suggested
by the theory. In addition, the relative price of consumer durables has a trend much
like the investment price, so using the overall consumption price confounds multiple
sources of technical change. The hours and interest rate variables are the same as
in BL's NIPA h system. As in BL, ¯ve lags are used. The VECM is estimated with
software provided by Berndt Lucke.
Table 1 displays the percent of the forecast error decomposition of hours which
can be attributed to the three kinds of technology using ID2, for one, two and three
common trends. With three common trends news shocks clearly dominate the other
technology shocks. From one year to eight years news shocks account for about one
half of the forecast error variance. The investment shock is important after two years
in this speci¯cation, but half as important as the news shock. Note how this last
¯nding di®ers from BL. This shows a sensitivity to measurement choices not evident
in BL. The neutral shock is irrelevant with three common trends. With two common
trends news shocks continue to dominate and now the investment shocks are much
less important. The neutral shocks continue to be irrelevant. With one common trend
news shocks are only dominant among the technology shocks at horizons under two
years. From two years to eight years, that is at horizons corresponding to business
cycle frequencies, investment shocks are the most important technology shock and
news shocks become much less important. Neutral shocks are still irrelevant. The
¯ndings with one common trend clearly are very di®erent from the results emphasized
in BL.
At this stage there is nothing to choose between these three scenarios. So, contrary
4Note that this measure of TFP is based on output prices, not consumption prices. This is the
correct way to proceed in all cases where there is a non-linear trade-o® between consumption and
investment. See footnote 3.
10to the claims in BL, within the VECM framework the data do not speak strongly
in favor of one kind of technology shock. There do seem to be two robust ¯ndings
however. First, technology shocks combined account for at least 50 percent of the
business cycle variation in hours. Second, neutral shocks are irrelevant.
4 An Economic Rationale for One Common Trend
When the data do not speak clearly on a question, it is natural to consider whether we
can use theory to provide guidance. Indeed this is precisely the kind of situation when
theory can be most useful. It turns out that the model described above (and a large
class of mainstream macro models) is de¯nitive on the question of how many common
trends one should expect to see in the data: exactly one. This section describes that
common trend.
By considering the balanced growth path of the model described above, it is easy
to verify that there is just one co-integrating relationship among the variables in BL's
baseline speci¯cation. Speci¯cally, the \error correction" variable xt given by




is stationary along the model's balanced growth path. The term St is equal to
Pk0tKt+1, where Pk0t is the price of new installed capital. It is the consumption
value of the capital stock and can be interpreted as the value of the representative
¯rm.
Assume that means have been removed from the variables used in constructing xt.
Then this variable has a very simple and intuitive interpretation. When xt = 0 then
the value of the ¯rm simply re°ects the current state of the long run fundamentals,
i.e. the levels of neutral and investment speci¯c technology. When xt 6= 0 then the
value of the ¯rm re°ects the e®ects of news and installation shocks since, in this
model, there are no other shocks.
Since this co-integrating relationship is predicted by a model which is at the heart
of most empirical DSGE models it is worth studying its empirical counterpart to learn
how it behaves. An empirical version of the error correction term is




11where ^ St is the leverage-adjusted value of the stock market, ^ At is measured neutral
technology and ^ PIt is the measured consumption price of investment. Below, these
variables are measured as previously described with the addition of data for leverage.
The leverage adjustment is to convert the stock market value into the value of the
underlying ¯rms. For this the leverage ratio for the non-¯nancial corporate sector
taken from the Flow of Funds accounts is used. Finally, ® = :33.
Figure 1 displays ^ xt after removing its mean. The series is clearly stationary
and has pronounced low frequency °uctuations. These low frequency movements are
suggestive of a role for news shocks. Over the sixties and early seventies the series is
positive. This seem in line with the view that news was generally good about future
productivity growth arising from neutral and investment technical change during this
time. From the early 1970s to the mid 1990s the series is negative, indicating that
the stock market undervalued the current state of technology, presumably because
the news was bad about future productivity growth. The second half of the 1990s
appear as a period of great optimism about future productivity growth. As of the end
of the sample, 2006q4, the series indicates the stock market re°ects the current state
of technology well, with news not pointing for any substantial changes in rates of
productivity growth going forward. Overall, the nature of this series seems consistent
with the theory, in the sense that it is stationary and that its dynamics seem in line
with what an empirical version of the model might predict.
If possible, it would be useful to compare ^ xt with the error correction terms associ-
ated with the estimates in Table 1. This could provide guidance on which speci¯cation
is most plausible. However, with the exception of the one common trend case, there
is not a unique way to write the error correction terms. So, it is not possible to
distinguish between the speci¯cations in this way. In the one common trend case,
the common trend is identi¯ed up to a factor of proportionality. Examining the error
correction term in this case reveals that it is nothing like the one suggested by the
theory.
Another approach to distinguishing among the speci¯cations in Table 1 is to ex-
amine the corresponding impulse responses to the technology shocks. Doing so reveals
something quite interesting: in all three speci¯cations the response of hours to the
individual technology shocks is permanent. The theory described above, and any
12mainstream macro model consistent with balanced growth, predicts transitory e®ects
of technology shocks. It is hard to know what to make of this ¯nding except that it
casts doubt on the VECM methodology.
5 An Alternative Empirical Strategy
The fact that mainstream theory predicts a single common trend suggests taking
seriously the ¯ndings in the last three columns of Table 1. However, the impulse
responses for hours are at odds with the theory so the veracity of these ¯ndings is in
doubt. Fortunately there is more than one way to write down a co-integrated system
and BL's identi¯cation assumptions do not depend on working within the con¯nes of
a VECM. This section considers an alternative empirical speci¯cation consistent with
the theory which does not su®er from the drawbacks of the VECM uncovered above.
One particularly convenient empirical approach involves estimating a garden va-
riety VAR. Given the implications of the theory, there is a natural VAR to consider:
the system including log ¯rst di®erences of TFP and the investment price, the error
correction variable x and hours and the interest rate in levels. This has the virtue
of imposing the co-integrating relationship derived from the theory. This system is
estimated using the same measures of the variables as before and by including ¯ve
lags (the results are similar with four lags.)
Figure 2 displays the impulse response functions for hours associated with the
three technology shocks identi¯ed using ID2. These responses are transitory and
appear large for the investment and news shocks. Table 2 displays the corresponding
forecast error decomposition. This shows that investment and news shocks each
account for about a quarter of the forecast error variance from three to eight years
out. Neutral shocks are again irrelevant. The ¯nding that about half of the forecast
error at horizons associated with the business cycle can be attributed to technology
shocks holds as well.
Now consider splitting the sample. There are many reasons to do so, including the
apparent trend break in the investment price emphasized by Fisher (2006). Splitting
the sample makes it possible to compare the ¯ndings to those in Fisher (2006). The
two subsamples are the same as in Fisher (2006): 1955q1-1979q2 and 1982q3-2006q4.
13Because of the shorter samples the estimates are based on including four lags.
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses for hours for the two sub-samples also
identi¯ed with ID2. In all cases the responses are transitory. The responses to the
investment and news shocks are both smaller in the ¯rst sub-sample compared to the
full sample. The magnitude of the response to the investment shock is now similar
to the neutral case, which continues to be small. The response to the news shock is
similar to the ones estimated over the ¯rst sub-sample in Fisher (2006) for neutral
and investment shocks. The second sub-sample is very di®erent. Here the response
to the investment shock is large and the responses to the other two shocks are small.
The response to the investment shock is similar to the one estimated in Fisher (2006).
Table 3 shows the corresponding variance decompositions. In the ¯rst sub-sample
the role of technology shocks is much diminished. News shocks at best account for
about a quarter of the forecast error from four to eight years. In the second subsample
investment shocks account for more than ¯fty percent of the variance at all horizons;
the other shocks are essentially irrelevant.
Overall, these ¯ndings paint a very di®erent picture to the one BL present. Over
the full sample news and investment shocks are equally important, each accounting
for a quarter of hours °uctuations. For the split sample, the news shock is marginally
important in the early period, but irrelevant in the later period. Investment shocks
are very important in the later period. One ¯nding which holds over from the VECM
analysis is that neutral shocks are always irrelevant.
6 An Important Caveat
So far this comment has not considered installation shocks. These are included in the
model to make a simple point about a potential speci¯cation error faced by any re-
duced form approach to identifying the di®erent technology shocks using stock market
and investment good prices. The DSGE literature has started to study installation
shocks. Justiniano et al. (2009), in a model similar to the one described here, ¯nd
that installation shocks account for about 3/4 of the business cycle variance of hours.
News and investment shocks account for virtually nothing. These ¯ndings are with
an estimation procedure that includes data on the investment price, which their prior
14work has not done.
This suggests that we need to consider the implications of ignoring the installation
shock. To gain intuition for why something like the installation shock could matter
for the ¯ndings I have presented and those in BL, consider the following equilibrium
relationship between the price of new installed capital, the price of investment, and




This close relationship between stock prices, the investment price and the marginal
installation product of investment strongly suggests that if the installation shock is
important, BL's identi¯cation strategy might attribute variation due to installation
shocks to news or investment shocks. Note that one does not have to rely on in-
stallation shocks to make this point. Any factor which in°uences the investment
process and so enters into this equation, including ¯nancial frictions, could lead to
speci¯cation error.5
To verify that this is indeed an issue, consider the following Monte Carlo exper-
iment involving a large number of datasets generated from the model in Justiniano
et al. (2009) in which news and investment shocks account for essentially zero busi-
ness cycle variation. Using this arti¯cial data, the VAR described in the previous
section is estimated many times, each time calculating the variance decomposition
using ID2. Over these many samples, the mean contribution of news shocks to the
forecast variance of hours at the 20 quarter horizon is 33%. Investment shocks are
correctly predicted to have a small e®ect.
7 Conclusion
This comment has raised serious questions about the plausibility of BL's ¯ndings.
The data do not support their conclusion that news shocks drive out other technology
shocks and are the primary mover of the business cycle. A balanced view of the data
5One way to address this possibility of speci¯cation error would be to take advantage of the fact
that the wedge between investment and stock prices is Hayashi's marginal q. Empirical measures of
q could be incorporated into the empirical model and assumptions developed to identify installation
shocks.
15suggests a role for both investment and news shocks. One BL ¯nding appears to be
robust: neutral shocks are not important for the business cycle. Of course, these
conclusions are subject to the caveat described in the previous section.
Where do we go from here? As we raise the number of shocks on the table, VARs
(or VECMs) become untenable, and we are nearing that point. So I think progress
in determining the sources of the business cycle is most likely to be within the DSGE
setting and in the direct measurement of shocks. The next steps for the DSGE litera-
ture should be to incorporate stock price and data and to endogenize the investment
price. In particular, the DSGE literature needs to move beyond identifying the in-
vestment price with the investment technology. Direct measurement of shocks, such
as in my work with Susanto Basu, John Fernald and Miles Kimball where we use the
US input-output tables and industry-level production data to identify sector-speci¯c
technology shocks, is a complementary approach and should provide information use-
ful for assessing DSGE ¯ndings.
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18Table 1: Variance Decomposition of Hours in the VECM
Three Common Trends Two Common Trends One Common Trend
Horizon Neut. Invest. News Neut. Invest. News Neut. Invest. News
1 .00 .00 .25 .00 .00 .25 .00 .05 .46
4 .02 .06 .50 .02 .04 .50 .04 .19 .44
8 .01 .21 .56 .01 .03 .58 .04 .40 .23
12 .02 .24 .49 .02 .05 .50 .02 .55 .14
20 .02 .26 .48 .02 .10 .40 .02 .64 .10
32 .01 .29 .53 .02 .11 .39 .01 .69 .07
Table 2: Variance Decomposition of Hours in the VAR, Full Sample
Horizon Neutral Investment News
1 .00 .09 .05
4 .00 .12 .03
8 .02 .16 .16
12 .03 .21 .25
20 .04 .25 .27
32 .04 .27 .26
19Table 3: Variance Decomposition of Hours in the VAR, Split Sample
1955q1-1979q2 1982q3-2006:4
Horizon Neutral Investment News Neutral Investment News
1 .01 .02 .14 .05 .60 .10
4 .02 .01 .11 .03 .71 .09
8 .02 .01 .10 .02 .67 .04
12 .02 .01 .15 .02 .63 .03
20 .03 .01 .22 .02 .57 .04
32 .02 .01 .30 .02 .54 .05
Figure 1: The Error Correction Term Suggested by the Model
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